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PRIVATE LAW AS BIOPOLITICS:
ORDOLIBERALISM, SOCIAL MARKET
ECONOMY, AND THE PUBLIC
DIMENSION OF CONTRACT
ALESSANDRO SOMMA*
I
INTRODUCTION
The transition of society from bourgeois to capitalist, that is, the coming of
the Industrial after the French Revolution, transformed the proprietary order
into a proprietary organism, incapable of producing emancipation. Private law
was still the foundation of society and still had to free the individual.
Nevertheless, pluralism had to be opposed in order to force economic behavior
into cooperative schemes able to produce systemic balance and development.
This is the point of reference for understanding the public dimension of
contract law consistent with ordoliberalism, in which citizenship is reinterpreted
through market categories: in particular those stressing that producers and
consumers hold delegated economic police functions and have to react
automatically to market stimuli.
For many reasons the European Union has been conceived as an ordoliberal
construct since its very beginning. Many efforts have been and still continue to
be made to develop the idea that the common or internal market is “at the
1
heart of the European project.” That’s why EU law is mainly concerned with
the prevention of market failures—that is, with the imposition of the correct
functioning of free competition. This goal is achieved by initiatives that are
sharply criticized for showing little respect for democratic decision-making, such
as those related to the recent sovereign debt restructuring. Indeed, sovereign
debt restructuring is legitimating imposed legal change expected to enhance the
2
efficient functioning of the market in ordoliberal terms.
To some extent this outcome is not surprising at all. From its very beginning,
the ordoliberal agenda encouraged transformations in the balance between
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politics and economics that must be seen as a continuation of the process of the
publicization of private law, the same process started with the crisis of the
3
bourgeois society and the emergence of the capitalist one. This crisis
culminated in the fascist reform of economic freedoms realized through the
suppression of political freedoms. Even if political freedoms were reestablished
after the fall of fascism, economic freedoms still characterize the construct of
Europe as an ordoliberal project affecting, among others, the formation of a
4
European contract law. This is what the concept of social market economy
represents: supporting the formation of an economic police state to impose an
economic eugenics and delegating economic police functions to individuals to
5
accomplish related systemic tasks.
These are the points of reference for considering ordoliberalism and social
market economy as biopolitics, as well as the related private law and public
6
dimension of contract.
II
THE PUBLICIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW
Notoriously, the distinction between private and public law is an artificial
one. It was conceived in a time when the economic and political spheres had to
be separated, the first representing the protection of the individual menaced by
the invasion of the second. While the political sphere was an organicist
ambience dissolving the individual within the order (well represented by the
7
image of the Leviathan), the economic sphere had to enhance individual
8
freedom and emancipation, understood as access to the proprietary order.
The identification of the individual with the owner, and that of society with
private law society, took place in a pre-capitalist context: it did not mean to
9
impose “the rites of cannibalism in the name of self-interest.” Indeed, as was
typical for a time when economics was still part of moral philosophy,
accumulation beyond real utility had no justification—everyone could obtain
property through labor, and workers had to be assured wages “at least sufficient
10
to maintain” themselves. These were the foundations of the bourgeois society,
in which the mythical invisible hand was understood to coordinate utilitarian
behavior and induced the rich to “make nearly the same distribution of

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 142–43 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
9. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 112 (Beacon Press 1965) (1944).
10. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 73 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994)
(1776).

07_SOMMA_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2013]

8/5/2013 12:33 AM

PRIVATE LAW AS BIOPOLITICS

107

necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into
11
equal portions among all its inhabitants.”
The process of modernization, that is, the transition from the bourgeois to
capitalist society, determined a profound alteration of this scheme. Mass
production needed the accumulation of property, as well as the division and
rationalization of labor, which ceased to assure access to property. The
12
capitalist society was based on a “forced schematization of the existence,”
which was assured by the transformation of the economic sphere into an
organicist ambience, with the systemic tensions typical of the political sphere
taking possession of the economic sphere.
In other words, even if discriminations based on feudal status had been
overcome by the bourgeois society, individuals were now polarized along the
13
lines of class-belonging, as is typical of the capitalist society. The dissimulation
of the new reality set up and reinforced the separation of owners and nonowners, as well as the premises of such divisions. The famous movement from
status to contract was not up to its evolutionist premises: private law based on
contractual freedom, understood as a value conceived for individual
emancipation, had developed into a means of oppression.
What then happened was the attempt to keep the identification of society
with the private law society, but also to transform society’s foundations. Indeed,
individual behaviors had to be functional in order to meet the needs of the
organicist ambience they were forced to keep in balance and develop. Private
law had to direct and coordinate the exercise of contractual freedom in order to
make it compatible with industrial production, which is characterized by the use
14
of machines and the imposition of strict hierarchies.
The “factory system” wanted to make sure “that the same rules apply to
numerous groups of workmen, considering the identicalness of nature and
15
duration of the labor relation.” The same happened with market relations—
those between producers as well as those between producers and consumers,
the former developing within cartels and the latter around large-scale
16
distribution, both determining the spread of standard-form contracts.
All this was in line with the idea of society as a whole, subject to dynamics
17
analogous to those of a biological organism. Organicism and functionalism
11. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 215 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
12. MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 439–40 (Steiner 2009) (1922).
13. See OTTO BRUNNER, STORIA SOCIALE DELL’EUROPA NEL MEDIOEVO 38–40 (1988) (1978).
14. SPIROS SIMITIS, The Case of the Employment Relationship, in PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL
INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 193–94 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
15. Giuseppe Messina, I Concordati di Tariffe nell’Ordinamento Giuridico del Lavoro, 2 RIVISTA
DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE I 458 (1904).
16. See RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTE: CONTRIBUTION A L’ETUDE
DE L’ACTE JURIDIQUE DANS LE CODE CIVIL ALLEMAND 229–30 (F. Pichon ed., Libraire Cotillon
1901).
17. AUGUSTE COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE 142 (Harry Martineau
trans., Batoche Books 2000) (1842).
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became a point of reference for an increasing number of rules aiming at
conforming individual behavior under a systemic point of view, affecting private
18
law in general and contract law in particular. The result was that individual
emancipation could be conceived only as a side effect of measures devoted to
producing the development of the proprietary order—now understood as
proprietary organism.
The result was an overcoming of the division of private and public law that
laid at the basis of the bourgeois society and the beginning of what can be
defined as the process of publicization of private law. The related body of rules
was supposed to conform individual behaviors relevant to the functioning of the
private law society, trying to outline a third way between traditional liberalism
and the rising socialist thought. The main distinction was between rules directly
conditioning the economic sphere and rules trying to do the same thing
indirectly. Yet, from many points of view, this was a false distinction: different
modes of regulation may be used to stabilize the same accumulation regime,
understood as patterns of production and consumption reproducible over a long
19
period.
The third way could take several forms. The supporters of solidarism, even
if they focused on self-determination and on the related “struggle for individual
development,” also sponsored an “association of individual actions” to
20
“maintain the individual in enduring prosperity and security.” Similarly,
functionalists recognized a certain space for “developing one’s individuality”
only if the use of the related power performed the duty of contributing to the
21
balance of the social organism. Professorial socialists pleaded for a new
synthesis of private and public law in order to overcome the image of the
22
“individual loose from any community.” A similar approach marked legal
socialism in its attempt to promote the coordination of classes towards common
23
ends.
III
ORDOLIBERAL CONTRACT LAW
The different ways of conceiving the process of publicization of private law
were related to considerations such as the balance between individual and
order, and the balance between emancipation and subordination to systemic
needs. Nevertheless, even measures with undeniable positive effects on
emancipation strategies had their systemic function, at least as social
18. EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 142 (Presses Universitaires de
France 1967) (1926).
19. See Robert Boyer & Yves Saillard, A Summary of Régulation Theory, in REGULATION
THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 36 (Robert Boyer & Yves Saillard eds., Routledge 2002).
20. LEON BOURGEOIS, SOLIDARITE 61–62 (1902).
21. LEON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATION GENERALES DU DROIT PRIVE 37 (1911).
22. OTTO GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE GRUNDFRAGE IN
WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19 JAHRHUNDERTS 9–12 (1889).
23. GIUSEPPE SALVIOLI, I DIFETTI SOCIALI DELLE LEGGI VIGENTI 102–05 (1906).
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peacekeeping tools or as a means of adapting society to the administrative tasks
of the state or to economic necessities of production. These strategies
24
influenced the emergence of the welfare state, which could be better described
in terms of welfare of the state, created to educate individuals and to make
them fit for armies and companies.
In such a situation, the dominance of the order over the individual had to
produce the abandonment of political freedoms, sacrificed to the reforms
intended to functionalize economic freedoms. This was exactly what
characterized the fascist third way between traditional liberalism and socialism
and what determined its dominance over attempts to balance individual and
order in such a way that conflict and emancipation could still coexist with
25
systemic tensions.
This evolution of capitalist societies can best be described through the
schemes suggested by a group of German scholars who were active during the
Nazi dictatorship. These scholars, later indicated as ordoliberals, developed the
idea of “economic constitution” in order to highlight the primacy of politics
over economics, but in such a way that the rules of an economic order based on
freedom of contract had to be seen as a point of political reference. These rules,
together with competition as an overarching principle, had to be imposed as a
26
political direction tool to enhance the functioning of the economic order —that
27
is, to prevent market failures due to the pursuit of individual strategies, both
for economic and emancipative purposes.
The economic constitution was thus a “partial constitution” to be put in tune
with the “whole political constitution.” It had to enhance individuals’
cooperation in order to functionalize and standardize their economic
performance, so as to strengthen the order from a systemic point of view:
behaviors that were detrimental to the development of the system had to be
28
sacrificed. These were the fundamental principles inspiring private law rules
typical for that time, such as rules that denied the validity of contracts contrary
29
to “interests worthy of protection under the legal order” or rules that fixed
30
conditions for the validity of standard contract terms.

24. ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, RECHT, STAAT, FREIHEIT 170–208 (1st ed. 1991).
25. See ALESSANDRO SOMMA, I GIURISTI E L’ASSE CULTURALE ROMA-BERLINO: ECONOMIA E
POLITICA NEL DIRITTO FASCISTA E NAZIONALSOCIALISTA 81–122 (2005).
26. FRANZ BÖHM, DIE ORDNUNG DER WIRTSCHAFT ALS GESCHICHTLICHE AUFGABE UND
RECHTSSCHÖPFERISCHE LEISTUNG 10 (1937).
27. See Leonhard Miksch, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Gebundenen Konkurrenz, in DER
WETTBEWERB
ALS
MITTEL
VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHER
LEISTUNGSSTEIGERUNG
UND
LEISTUNGSAUSLESE 102–04 (Günter Schmölders ed., 1942).
28. BÖHM, supra note 26, at 12–13.
29. C.c. art. 1341–42.
30. See id.; see also the rules discussed within the redaction of The Nazi Volksgesetzbuch, in
AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT
1933–1945: PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHUSSE
VOLKSGESETZBUCH 119 (Werner Schubert ed., 1988).
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After the fall of the Nazi dictatorship, political freedoms were restored, but
economic freedoms still had to be conformed in line with the ordoliberal
agenda. For that reason, a new formula was needed to hide embarrassing
31
continuities. That is why the term “social market economy” was coined, which
indicated an “irenic” order, able to integrate and to “lead the essential forces of
32
society towards real cooperation.” More precisely, economic freedoms had to
33
be fostered when able to promote competition and opposed when they did not.
Freedom of contract had to be combined with mainly indirect state
interventions aimed at conditioning individual behavior as needed to avoid
market failures or to promote social cohesion.
This is the point of reference for identifying the public dimension of
contract, the same characterizing current efforts to develop a European private
law, in line with the reference made by the Treaty on the European Union to “a
highly competitive social market economy” as the foundation needed to
34
“establish an internal market.” To that end, an international network of
scholars was established and asked to provide “a more coherent European
contract law,” focusing on improving the existing acquis and suggesting “an
optional instrument, which would provide parties to a contract with a modern
35
body of rules.”
The result was a “Draft Common Frame of Reference,” a set of “principles,
definitions and rules of European Private Law.” These include freedom of
36
contract as “the starting point,” with limitations intended to prevent market
failures by functionalizing economic behavior in order to enhance its
consistency with a free competition-based market order and to assume the
related distributive effects as a point of reference for the European social
37
model.
All this is in line with the approach inspiring the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which promotes only formal equality before the law and
neglects social rights—that is, limitations on the freedom of contract for
purposes directly connected with the will of promoting individual emancipation
38
over market order. If individual capacities have to be promoted, it is only to
39
fulfill an institutional precondition of an economy based on free competition.
31. This aspect is very controversial among scholars. See RALF PTAK, VOM ORDOLIBERALISMUS
ZUR SOZIALEN MARKTWIRTSCHAFT (2004).

32. Alfred Müller-Armack, Das Gesellschaftspolitische Leitbild der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, 12
WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE CHRONIK 11 (1962).
33. Walter Eucken, Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung, 2 ORDO 52, 52–57 (1949).
34. Treaty on the European Union, art. 3.
35. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A
More Coherent European Contract Law—An Action Plan, at 23, COM (2003) 68 final (Feb. 2, 2003).
36. STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & ACQUIS GRP., DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF
REFERENCE—OUTLINE EDITION 62 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., European Law Publishers 2009).
37. Alessandro Somma, Towards a European Private Law? The Common Frame of Reference in
the Conflict between EC Law and National Laws, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW AFTER THE COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE 1–23 (Hans-W. Micklitz & Fabrizio Cafaggi eds., 2010).
38. See THE POLITICS OF THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (Alessandro Somma ed.,
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IV
SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY AS EUGENICS
Due to its organicist inspiration, the social market economy does not take
care of individual needs. Producers and consumers, seen as economic actors
representing the whole system of supply and demand, have to accomplish
systemic tasks: they hold delegated economic police functions defined within
the ordoliberal way of functionalizing individual behaviors. Producers want to
escape from competition, so the law has to preclude agreements among
producers to prevent such an outcome. Consumers would avoid investing time
to make an accurate and rational comparison of products to buy; nevertheless,
their legal protection has to be conceived as mere promotion of self40
determination and capability of making informed choices. From this point of
41
view, European contract law is developing as a sort of “Neo-Pandectistic,”
sponsoring a contract law based on Roman law categories, thus inventing a
tradition for neoliberal visions of society.
Workers disappear as an autonomous category: they have to behave as
consumers or as producers, abandoning conflicting visions of their role in
society and assuming a cooperative attitude toward their taking part in
production. European citizenship, understood as the meeting point between the
individual and the order, develops along the point of view of production and
42
consumption instead of that of labor.
This scheme is needed to obtain a systemic effect consistent with a form of
economic eugenics: to determine an efficient demand, which is, in turn,
necessary to select supply within the competitive mechanism. It has nothing to
do with individual emancipation, which would frustrate the functioning of the
system by allowing individuals to develop in a different way than that conceived
43
by the current form of economic racism —outside the boundaries of homo
oeconomicus based behavioral schemes. Neither does it have to do with the idea
of taking the distributive effects of private law into account, since redistribution
has to be the end of state interventions outside the market, which are meant to
be financed through taxation and realized to avoid the formation of social
rights. Private law has to ignore redistribution, or better, to reproduce the
redistribution resulting from the functioning of the market: private law only has
to guard the balance and development of the proprietary order by enhancing
Wolters Kluwer 2009).
39. Simon Deakin, Capacitas: Contract Law and Institutional Preconditions of a Market Economy,
2 EUR. REV. CONTRACT LAW 317, 317–41 (2006).
40. See ALESSANDRO SOMMA, ECONOMIA DI RAZZA: DAL FASCISMO ALLA CITTADINANZA
EUROPEA 129–33 (2009)
41. See Paolo Cappellini, Scienza Civilistica, Rivoluzioni Industriali, Analisi Economica del Diritto:
Verso una Neopandettistica Involontaria?, 15 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO
GIURIDICO MODERNO 523, 523–30 (1986).
42. Pietro Costa, Cittadinanza Sociale e Diritto del Lavoro Nell’Italia Repubblicana, in DIRITTO E
LAVORO NELL’ITALIA REPUBBLICANA 21–83 (Gian Guido Balandi & Giovanni Cazzetta eds., 2009).
43. SOMMA, supra note 40, at 110–24.
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individual capacities consistent with market competition rules. This is the point
of reference for disclosing the public dimension of contract consistent with the
current evolution of capitalism and for letting its biopolitical inspiration
44
emerge.
To verify how this scheme helps to detect the deep inspiration of European
contract law, one can refer to the rules concerning the prohibition of
discrimination in order to underline continuities between the prohibition’s
origin and its current development.
The first time private law considered such a prohibition was during World
War II, within the so-called Fair Employment Act, an executive order of U.S.
President Roosevelt that “reaffirm[ed] policy of full participation in the defense
45
program by all persons, regardless of race, creed, color or national origin.”
Indeed, from its very beginning, non-discrimination policies were intended to
enhance the functioning of the market in such a way, for example, that it could
fit into national defense strategies. Afterwards, other state strategies were
enhanced by the prohibition of discrimination. Nevertheless, their compliance
with systemic needs of the market order never ceased to represent its first
inspiration, as the current evolution in EU contract law clearly shows.
Emancipative effects are not excluded, but they mainly represent the indirect
effects of functionalizing strategies directly aimed at favoring the market order.
In line with this scheme, the Draft Common Frame of Reference provides
for “a right not be discriminated against on the grounds of sex or ethnic or
racial origin in relation to a contract” concerning “goods or services which are
46
available to the public.” This is not a rule directly protecting human rights, as
47
stated in the introduction to the Draft, at least not in the sense that human
rights have directly to do with individual emancipation, not in the sense that
they do not need to be filtered by the market systemic logic. Of course, the
protection of human rights through a market economy is a possible outcome, a
possible side effect of a rule concerning the inclusion in the market of persons
called upon to fulfill systemic tasks or delegated economic police functions. A
supplier of goods or services, denying the conclusion of a contract with certain
categories of consumers, prevents them from acting as efficient selectors of his
or her supply. He or she exercises an autonomous economic power, imposing
his or her own strategy on how, or how not, to make use of the competitive
mechanism.
For the same reasons, discriminatory behavior of our supplier will be taken
into account by consumer-protection rules, producing possible emancipatory
side effects, even if directly conceived as rules aiming at preventing market

44. VANNI CODELUPPI, BIOCAPITALISMO VERSO LO SFRUTTAMENTO INTEGRALE DEI CORPI,
CERVELLI ED EMOZIONI (2008).
45. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941) (capitalizations removed).
46. STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & ACQUIS GRP, supra note 36, at 14.
47. Id.
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failures. This is the sense of social market economy and of the ordoliberal
48
inspiration for non-discrimination in European contract law.
We derive evidence of such inspiration by considering the personal
characteristics that are taken into account by the rule we have just mentioned—
that is, a person’s sex and racial or ethnic origin. A broader formulation is
contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also prohibits
49
discrimination on the grounds of “social origin” and “property.” Considering
these characteristics would mean, for example, that a bank could not refuse a
loan to a temporary worker. Such a measure would contribute to individual
emancipation, but would also represent a possibly disruptive factor for the
correct functioning of the market in a private law society. Emancipation
through the market may be an illusion, and it is often an illusion.
The idea of social market economy as eugenics and as a form of economic
racism may be found in what early ordoliberals used to postulate about the
supremacy of the political over the economic constitution: that the economic
constitution, just like demography and racial biology, had to put into effect the
50
political constitution. Such a statement helps us to understand how the
prevalence of the order over the individual in systemic terms has to be seen as
the main characteristic of ordoliberalism and the reason for its tendency to
direct behaviors in biopolitical terms.
V
ORDOLIBERALISM AS BIOPOLITICS
The current use of biopolitics in social science discourse mainly goes back to
51
Michel Foucault. We find a first attempt to define this concept in his trilogy on
the history of sexuality, in which he describes a progressive shift in the essence
of political power, more and more inclined to “foster life or disallow it to the
death” than to “take life or let live.” To that end, an “anatomo-politics of the
human body” and “a bio-politics of the population” are needed—the first
concentrating on “the body as a machine” and the second on “the species
52
body.”
Investigating its origin, Foucault establishes a link between biopolitics,
defined as the attempt “to rationalize the problems posed to governmental
practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a
population,” and the “political rationality” of liberalism. In this context the
latter is considered anything but a theory on unlimited freedom, because

48. Alessandro Somma, Principio di Non Discriminazione e Cittadinanza nel Diritto Privato
Europeo, in IL DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO EUROPEO 259, 259–
80 (Guido Alpa et al. eds., 2009).
49. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21.
50. BÖHM, supra note 26, at 13 (showing that ordoliberals and Nazi regime converged well apart
from the idea on how market should be ordered).
51. See also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998).
52. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE WILL TO KNOWLEDGE 135–39 ( 2d ed. 1990) (1976).
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liberalism “needs freedom,” but also needs to “consume” it as a condition of
historical and social possibilities for a free market economy. As for the specific
ordoliberal way of matching together production and consumption of freedom,
Foucault notes that early supporters of that doctrine intended to redefine
53
capitalist rationality in a different way than the one sponsored by the Nazis.
Some parts of this reasoning may be questioned. For example, one may
question the implicit idea that anatomo-politics of the human body and
biopolitics of the population can be distinguished, because it is difficult to
conceive the latter without the former. This is particularly true for biopolitics
enhancing a market order based on free competition, which acts at an anatomic
and biological level, but also with deeper conditionings influencing consumers
as well as producers, the latter including capital and labor conceived as a
54
cooperative community.
The consideration of ordoliberalism and Nazism as alternative ideologies
concerning the market order is also problematic. Indeed, ordoliberals did not
oppose Nazi direct intervention in the market order, since they thought of a
combination of direct and indirect state interference according to the historic
55
contingencies. Moreover, even if ordoliberalism is not necessarily linked to
antidemocratic thinking and practices, it is at least indifferent towards the
destiny of democracy. Politics has to impose a market order based on
competition and this agenda may also include the instauration of authoritarian
or totalitarian regimes. In doing this politics still makes use of violence, even if
56
related to aesthetics which are different from the traditional one.
Above all, ordoliberalism intends to fight pluralism in order to reduce
57
individual behavior to a mere automatic reaction to market stimuli. This
implies a condemnation of pluralism as such, which is seen as a source of
conflicts because it enhances individual emancipation. Thus, pluralism is an
obstacle to functionalizing strategies of the proprietary organism, in a way that
is incompatible with democratic decision-making: ordoliberalism intends to
enhance vital forces simply in order to guide them towards systemic needs
58
transcending the individual.
The struggle against pluralism derives from conceiving ordoliberalism as a
completion of the program of the French Revolution. In fact, following

53. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE
1978–1979, at 63, 317–22 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008). See also Richard Faber,
Autoritärer Liberalismus: Von Thomas Hobbes zu Carl Schmitt, in LIBERALISMUS IN GESCHICHTE
UND GEGENWART 59–77 (Richard Faer ed., 2000).
54. See LAURA BAZZICALUPO, IL GOVERNO DELLE VITE: BIOPOLITICA ED ECONOMICA (2006).
55. BÖHM, supra note 26, at 103–04.
56. FORME CONTEMPORANEE DI TOTALITARISMO (Massimo Recalcati ed., 2007).
57. F. Böhm, Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsordnung für die Politische Verfassung, 1
SÜDDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 141, 147 (1946).
58. See Alessandro Somma, Der Faschismus und die Große Transformation. Modernisierung und
soziale Befriedung in den Europäischen Diktaturen, in ÖSTERREICH 1933–1938: INTERDISZIPLINÄRE
ANNÄHERUNGEN AN DAS DOLLFUß-/SCHUSCHNIGG-REGIME (Ilse Reiter-Zatloukal ed., 2012).
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ordoliberal thinkers, the bourgeois society had a fundamental historical
function, since it gave value to the principle of self-determination, thus freeing
the individual from the constraints of feudal structures. Yet, the order of the
bourgeois society started exactly as “order,” aimed at the steering of individual
forces towards a “reasonable general use.” In the program of the French
Revolution, “the aim of liberation and the aim of direction could not be
59
separated.”
A link with the French Revolution ideology may also be seen in the
ordoliberal fight against pluralism. To overcome the feudal structures, French
revolutionaries had to remove each intermediary body between the individual
and the state. Similarly, from the very beginning, ordoliberals pleaded for a
60
“strong state” able to establish a “healthy economy,” that is, a state that has to
impede the emergence of powers acting in a different way than that consistent
with the needs of the economic system.
The biopolitical inspiration of this program may be seen in the analysis of
what is intended to produce an effective conformation of economic life.
Ordoliberals did not condemn direct conformation by law, which was supposed
to produce positive effects if needed by the circumstances. However, they tried
to demonstrate the supremacy of indirect conformation, not only because of the
aptitude of the procedural approach to guiding economic actors towards
concrete and precise substantial results. Indirect regulation was supposed to act
as a “state-psychology” that could transform an individual into a tool of
“political direction of social day-life,” even if he or she is not conscious of the
61
fulfillment of the state’s “higher aims.” In other words, a market order based
on free competition may rely on rules recognized by market operators. The
market order may also rely on “procedures and behaviors that reproduce basic
social relationships, guide active growth regimes and ensure the accounting of a
myriad of decentralized decisions, without actors necessarily being aware of
62
these system-wide adjustment principles.” This is the main point of reference
for holding ordoliberalism as a typical biopolitics.
In line with biopolitics is also the reference to the “social,” which can be
found in the evolution of ordoliberalism, above all with reference to the
meaning of “social market economy.” This expression intends to underline the
fact that a free competition-based market is a source of social values per se, so
that no conformation of economic behavior in line with a social rights system is
needed. What is more important from our point of view is that “social” refers to
the need to produce social cohesion in order to prevent conflicts related to the
process of modernization, which has to be encouraged in biopolitical terms.
59. BÖHM, supra note 26, at 3–7.
60. Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und Gesunder Wirtschaft, 2 VOLK UND REICH 81–94 (1933).
61. Alexander Rüstow, Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik, 7 DER DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRT 169,
172 (1932). See also BÖHM, supra note 26, at 113.
62. Robert Boyer, How and Why Capitalism Differs (Max-Planck-Institut für
Gesellschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper 05/4, 2005), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/
dp05-4.pdf.

07_SOMMA_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

116

8/5/2013 12:33 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:105

This concern has led to the combination of market-order doctrines and
63
Catholic social teaching, following early ordoliberalism with its traditional plea
64
for class harmony and collaboration. Even if this enhances corporatism,
allowing forms of pluralism that were opposed by early ordoliberalism, the
same cannot be said for social market economy, thus confirming the biopolitical
essence of the modes of regulations needed to stabilize the related
accumulation regime.
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